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A medical center department chair has just been notified that a
physician in his department, "Dr. G," is being sued for the fifth time in
seven years. The CEO of co-defendant hospital wants the chair to
solve Dr. G's "claims problems." At the chair's request, the hospital
peer review committee evaluates Dr. G's malpractice cases. While
committee members note some minor concerns in the cases, they
conclude that in each circumstance he has met the standard of care.
They cannot identify any specific technical or educational need, nor
can they supply justification for a disciplinary action.
The chair is in a vexing situation. Is Dr. G. the victim of bad
luck, or is something more systematic at work? Is there some failure
or deficiency other than technical incompetence which is making this
physician vulnerable to malpractice suits? If so, is it remediable?
In this Article, we analyze the ability of peer review to
recognize and reduce physicians' risk of medical malpractice claims.
Critics argue that peer review neither consistently identifies
substandard physicians, nor ensures their removal, while it unfairly
targets colleagues for reasons such as economic competition. They
suggest that the solution may be to modify statutes governing
privilege and immunity, or to increase penalties for healthcare
institutions that violate reporting statutes. Critics' concerns may be
misplaced. We will argue that peer review is not deficient in its basic
conception, but rather aspects of its design and implementation which
often do not directly link it to an institution's risk management
activities.
We assert that peer review can effectively identify a
physician's risk of generating a disproportionate share of medical
malpractice claims ex ante, and present a sample methodology which
allows peer review to more effectively help physicians address that
risk.
Part I of this Article discusses the background and authority
for peer review. Part II outlines common criticisms of peer review and
discusses shortcomings in these analyses.
Part III describes
background medical malpractice research and introduces the Patient
Advocacy Reporting System ("PARSSM") program for peer review. In
Part IV we conclude with a discussion of programmatic elements
which, if incorporated into the legal framework for peer review, may
allow peer review committees to systematically evaluate, monitor,
and, potentially reduce physicians' medical malpractice claims risk.
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I. BACKGROUND OF PEER REVIEW
A. TraditionalPeer Review
"Peer review" is a generic term representing a range of
processes established by hospitals, medical groups, and other health
care entities to ensure qualified and competent medical staff and
quality care. 3 Three premises underlie traditional peer review. The
first premise is that due to their unique and specialized training, only
physicians can properly evaluate and judge other physicians' medical
practices and detect when colleagues pose a risk to patient care. 4 The
second premise is that a milieu supporting candid communication is
most likely to foster recognition of both exemplary and substandard
The third premise is that peer review participants are
care. 5
motivated to maintain high standards of care in their group or
6
institution and act in good faith.
The idea of peers reviewing each other as a quality control
measure would appear to have several advantages. 7 Peer review
offers an incentive for similarly trained physicians working in the
same environment to identify colleagues with knowledge gaps or
deficiencies in technical skills, facilitate their remediation, and
monitor their progress and performance, in preference to external

See Kenneth R. Kohlberg, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Linchpin for Patient
3.
Safety Measures, 86 MASS. L. REV. 157, 157 (2002) ("Peer review is a process by which physicians
analyze critically the medical services performed by their colleagues for the purpose of
decreasing instances of medical malpractice."); see also David L. Fine, The Medical Peer Review
Privilege in Massachusetts:A Necessary Quality Control Measure or an Ineffective Obstruction of
EquitableRedress?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 811, 811-13 (2005) (discussing peer review as a tool
to reduce medical error); George E. Newton, Commentary, Maintainingthe Balance: Reconciling
the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical PeerReview Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 723 (2001)
("Medical peer review is a process by which physicians evaluate the quality of work performed by
their colleagues for the purpose of determining compliance with appropriate standards of health
care.").
4.
Newton, supra note 3, at 723.
5.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219(b)(1) (2005) ("to candidly, conscientiously, and
objectively ... review their peers' professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice
medicine. Tennessee further recognizes that confidentiality is essential...").
6.
ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 57-62
(2002) (stating that surgeons take weekly Mortality and Morbidity conferences seriously, and
that case review raises awareness and improves the ability to anticipate and head off problems).
But see Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is it Time for
a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 26 (1999) (discussing how physicians have little incentive to
conduct effective peer review except as required to maintain hospital privileges).
7.
See, e.g., Newton, supra note 3, at 723 ("The fundamental rationale behind the peer
review process is efficiency...").
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parties assuming this responsibility.8
In addition, when serious
problems are identified, appropriate steps can be taken to limit
doctors' contact with patients well before government agencies are
involved or can act. 9 Peer review may also lead physicians to seek and
accept help for medical, psychiatric, or impairment issues. Finally,
peer review groups can promptly refer safety and quality issues they
identify to committees or authorities empowered to address them
within an institution.10
B. The Statutory Scheme
One mechanism by which the medical community has
attempted to address the problem of substandard medical care 1 is
institutionalized peer review. The first peer review efforts were
12
voluntary in nature and established by medical professionals.
Recognizing that frank and open discussion of quality and safety
problems is critical for improving care, Congress and most state
legislatures in the 1980s and 1990s enacted statutes to encourage the
process by minimizing the risk that participants in peer review
activities would later be subject to litigation for those very activities.
State statutory schemes grant differing levels of protection to peer
review, but they all incorporate at least one of three types of
protection: 13 (1) immunity from liability; (2) evidentiary privilege for
8.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(a)(7) (2006) ( "It is the intent of the Legislature
that peer review... be done.., with an emphasis on early detection of potential quality
problems and resolutions through informal educational interventions."); see James R. Jensen,
Medical Staff Peer Review - A Peek Behind the Veil, RISK MANAGEMENT REPORTS, May 1998, at 1
(stating that peer review should not be performed by physicians in the same clinical setting so
personal relationships do not interfere with ability to perform the review properly); Fine, supra
note 3, at 829 (using Amtrak and USDA as examples, suggests supplanting peer review statutes
with third party review).
9.
See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 2005, Standard MS.1.20, 1213 (addressing suspension of privileges or medical staff membership, and the procedures to
accomplish this).
10. See, e.g., H.H. McGuire et al., Measuringand Managing Quality of Surgery. Statistical
vs. Incidental Approaches, 127 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 733, 736 (1992) (suggesting tactics to
maximize patient safety and minimize error).
11. Kohlberg, supra note 3, at 157.
12. See Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 12-13 & n.39 (citing Murray G. Savsgeen & Jennifer L.
Thompson, The Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North Dakota, 73 N.D. L. REV. 477, 478
(1997)) (discussing how several professional healthcare associations joined together to establish
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO) which required, as an accreditation
standard, that hospital medical staffs implement uniform peer review guidelines for new and
current medical staff).
13. Id. at 27 & n.152 (discussing the spectrum and frequency of state statutory schemes and
listing state peer review laws). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2305.25(E)(1), (2) (West 2006)
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documents furnished, 14 utilized, or created; 15 and (3) denial of access
to documents for third parties for extra-judicial purposes. 16 The
statutes generally provide that peer review is protected only if it is
conducted in good faith.17
Congress took a role in promoting professional peer review by
enacting the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
("HCQIA").18
HCQIA immunizes peer review participants from
liability for damages,1 9 but does not grant an evidentiary privilege. 20
Peer review must be conducted in good faith and meet minimum
21
requirements for due process in order for federal immunity to attach.
(defining peer review committees and listing included types); Fine, supra note 3, at 814-15
(stating that a lack of uniformity among state statutes and application by federal courts creates
conflicting results); Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protection of State and
FederalPeer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 547 n.44, 549 n.54 (2003) (listing
state peer review statutes with privilege provisions and state statutes with immunity
protection).
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-333(d) (2006) (protecting "[aill information, interviews,
reports, statements, or memoranda furnished to any committee [under (b)]"); see also Marshall v.
Planz, 145 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1264-67 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding that privilege covers a
communication to a peer review committee by a non-committee member); Gail N. Friend et al.,
The New Rules of Show and Tell: Identifying and Protecting the Peer Review and Medical
Committee Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 607, 609-43 (1997) (examining the expansive scope of
the privilege conferred by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06 and TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032). But see Newton, supra note 3, at 731 (explaining that "original
source" documents, even if utilized by peer review committees, are still discoverable).
15. Fine, supra note 3, at 824.
16. Nijm, supra note 13, at 548 n.50 (listing 13 states which do not address the issue of
confidentiality); see also Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 53-54 & n.352 (stating that confidentiality
statutes do not have the effect of denying plaintiffs access to information in the absence of a
privilege statute).
17. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 30 & n.183. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(a)(3)
(West 2006) ("peer review, fairly conducted, preserves... [the] highest standards of medical
practice"); see also Marshall v. Planz, 145 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1270-72 (finding that ALA. CODE § 65-333(a) requires peer review action to be done without malice to preserve immunity, but (d) does
not require good faith to preserve evidentiary privilege).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006). Under § 11115(a), HCQIA will not preempt states' programs
with greater immunities than the federal law provides. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 809
(West 2006) (California's opt out provision).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)-(2) (2006). However, civil rights violations are not protected
under this immunity clause. Id. § 11111(a)(1).
20. See, e.g., Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 291-92 (7th Cir. 2001) (declining
to recognize a privilege under the HCQIA); Mattice v. Mem'l Hosp. of South Bend, 203 F.R.D.
381, 385-86 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (finding peer review materials discoverable and weighing state
interests in peer review privilege against interests protected by federal anti-discrimination laws);
Alissa M. Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and Recognize a
Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 707-12 (2003) (arguing U.S. Supreme
Court's application in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), of the "reason and experience" clause
of FED. R. EVID. 501 should be extended to recognition of peer review activity).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2006) (setting forth four federal immunity prerequisites: belief
that the review furthered the quality of healthcare; good-faith effort to obtain the facts; reviewed
physician given adequate notice and afforded due process; hospital had reasonable belief action
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In the preface to HCQIA, Congress states that it found a
pattern of incompetent physicians moving from state to state without
disclosure of their past history. 22 To address this particular gap,
HCQIA established the National Practitioner Databank ("NPDB"), a
central repository for mandatory reports from hospitals regarding
disciplinary actions involving curtailment, suspension, or revocation of
privileges.2 3 All malpractice payments made on behalf of a physician
24
named in a lawsuit must also be reported to the NPDB.
Credentialing bodies are required to check the NPDB database before
granting privileges to physicians or re-appointing them. 25 Reports
made to the NPDB are confidential, and access is restricted to
26
licensing boards, health care entities, and involved practitioners.
C. Private Standard Setting
Peer review is closely connected with a more general concept of
regulation that relies on private standard setting. 27 In the case of peer
review, much of this private standard setting is performed by private
was warranted); Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 32 & n.197 (stating that failure to satisfy HCQIA's
due process requirement is sufficient to prevent federal immunity, but claims of bad faith are
immaterial to a § 11112(a) inquiry (citing Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 635 (3d
Cir. 1996); Bryan v. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994); Austin v.
McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1992))).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (2006).
23. See Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 35-57 (providing evidence for under-reporting of
adverse disciplinary actions).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a)-(b) (2006). See Phyllis Maguire, New Data Bank Casts Wider Net,
ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, Jan. 1999, http://www.acponline.org/shell-cgi/printhappy.pl/journals/news
/jan99/databank.htm (noting that "corporate loophole" malpractice payment reporting is
circumvented if the physician is dropped as a named defendant when the health plan, medical
group, or hospital makes a settlement payment. If the NPDB report contains incomplete
information about the circumstances of an incident, the doctor who settles but is not at fault may
have trouble getting insurance or obtaining privileges.); see also Lawrence E. Smarr, A
Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National PractitionerData
Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 60 (1997) (stating that
the NPDB does not screen reports, so payments are not necessarily indicative of negligence).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (2006).
26. Id. § 11137(b)(1).
27. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1649-50 (1996)
(explaining how norms generated within civil society become informally codified by private
institutions and serve as standards for the relevant parties; norms may be incorporated into the
legal system by serving as sources of common law decisions or templates for positive enactments
by statute or regulation); see also John P. Marren et al., The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need
to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related
Solutions, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 206 (2004) (discussing JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION
OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL

HANDBOOK 2002, Med. Staff Standard 2, at MS-3e). The Accreditation Manual is consistent with
the case law of Darling,Johnson, and Siqueira. See infra note 32.
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organizations, including the American Medical Association ("AMA") 28
and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO"). 29 Institutional accreditation by JCAHO
has become so widely accepted and desired that compliance with its
30
standards is considered a measurement of quality.
For standard setting to be effective, a healthcare facility's
governing board must endorse standards and enforce them. 31 Hospital
governing boards generally delegate peer review to the medical staff,
but are ultimately accountable for the quality of care. 32 By-laws
delineate an institution's procedures for imposing discipline including
curtailment, suspension, or revocation of physicians' privileges.

28. See Philip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Peer Review
Law at California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 301, 308 (2004) (noting that the California
Medical Association annotated Model Medical Staff Bylaws use federal and state requirements
and JCAHO standards as a model for medical staff bylaws); see also AMA Code of Medical
Ethics, Ethical Opinion E-4.07, E-9.10 (due process requirements), Policy H-230.989 (goal of peer
review is patient safety and quality), H-225.992, H-230.989, H-375.983, H-375.997, H-375.984
(peer review is an ethical obligation). The AMA proposes to incorporate into its policy the
Massachusetts Medical Society's 'Model Principles for Incident-Based Peer Review for Health
Care Facilities," which support remediation over punitive measures and transparent safeguards
for a fair process. See AMA, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 17-1-04, PRINCIPLES FOR
INCIDENT-BASED PEER REVIEW AND DISCIPLINING AT HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 1, available at

http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/465/botl7i04.rtf
(discussing the benefits of
adopting the Massachusetts Medical Society's Model Principles); MASS. MED. SOC'Y, MODEL
PRINCIPLES FOR INCIDENT-BASED PEER REVIEW FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 7-8 (2005),
available at http://www.massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=PPRC-Legal_
Issues&template=/CMiContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=725 (summarizing the disciplinary
process under the Massachusetts Model Principles).
29. See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 2005 ACC-13, MS.4.90
(stating that ACC-13 requires linkage of results of peer review and focused monitoring to medical
staff credentialing and privileging, and MS.4.90 requires hospitals to "identify a minimum set of
circumstances" to trigger review of specific individuals' performance by peers; medical staffs
must provide for "measurement and assessment activities," and evaluate practitioners'
competence).
30. See Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 155 (N.D. 1996) (finding that peer
review privilege is limited to committees mandated by law, JCAHO or internal medical review or
quality assurance committees).
31. Marren, supra note 27, at 231-32 (summarizing recommendations for hospital
governing boards to discharge their duty to insure quality).
32. Id. at 196-207 (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257
(Ill. 1965) (concluding that hospitals must exercise due diligence in hiring, assure continued
qualifications of physicians, and supervise all care); Siqueira v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 477
N.E.2d 16, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that the board of directors maintains power of ultimate
resolution); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981) (finding that
the doctrine of corporate negligence requires due diligence in hiring and granting privileges as
part of governing body's non-delegable accountability for quality of care)).
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However, precise guidelines defining the terms under which privileges
33
may be restored are rarely outlined.
II. THE VALUE OF PEER REVIEW

A. Critiquesof PeerReview
Peer review was the subject of intense scholarly controversy
even before statutory enactments by the federal and state
governments, and remains so today. 34 As in the past, fairness in the
review and discipline of doctors continues to be a concern. More
recent debate also centers on whether peer review is meeting its goals
of advancing the quality and safety of healthcare. 35 In this latter
regard, critics of peer review focus on a number of related issues,
including (1) the effect of immunity and evidentiary privilege statutes
on public welfare; (2) peer review's ability to detect problem physicians
and remediate or remove them; and (3) the impact of mandatory
reporting statutes.
The courts play a role in interpreting statutes that establish an
evidentiary privilege or rule of confidentiality for the peer review
process. 36
When they deny judicial or extra-judicial access to
information about peer review proceedings and results, critics argue,
peer review operates to the disadvantage of both patients who have
experienced substandard care and physicians who have been accused
37
of it.
33. But see AMA, Proposed Amendment to Policy H-265.998(9), http://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/mmI465/boti7i04.rtf
(last visited May 31, 2006) (amending
"Guidelines for Due Process" to read, "when feasible, the hearing body should include terms that
permit measurement and validation of the completed remediation process").
34. See, e.g., Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329-33 (1991) (finding that
plaintiffs allegation of conspiracy to exclude him from Los Angeles market by terminating
privileges through peer review satisfied Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirements); Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 98 n.3, 101-06 (1988) (noting the Ninth Circuit's assessment that the peer
review in this case was "shabby, unprincipled, and unprofessional" and finding that the state
action doctrine does not protect peer reviewers from federal anti-trust liability); see also
Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 425-37 (1993) (explaining that participants in peer review
are at risk under federal anti-trust law and suggesting how to minimize the risk). But see Friend,
supra note 14, at 656 (citing a trilogy of 1996 cases - Mem'l Hosp.-The Woodlands v. McCown,
927 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996); Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996);
Brownwood Reg'l Hosp. v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 927 S. W.2d 24 (Tex. 1996) - finding strong
peer review privilege in Texas).
35. Sheutzow, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that peer review statutes are ineffective to meet
their goal of high quality medical practice and should be "eliminated or reformed").
36. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 3, at 822-25.
37. Id. at 825.
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With respect to patients' claims, some critics assert that peer
review shields information that may reasonably be related to the
subject matter of the contested issues in a malpractice case, 38 such as
incident reports 39 "furnished to" peer review committees, when
deemed nondiscoverable. 40 Despite a recent trend towards making
such records available to plaintiffs, 4 1 in many jurisdictions they are
42
still difficult to obtain.
Court decisions, 43 legislation, and public referenda reflect a
shifting view of the relative benefits and burdens of keeping peer
review a closed process. 44 These battles may well be a result of
disappointment with a process that is perceived as failing to identify
problem physicians before they become involved in malpractice claims.
Recent events in Florida illustrate the tension between providing
patients with access to peer review materials and the principles
underlying the protection of "quality-of-care" records.
In 2004, voters in Florida approved Amendment 7 to the state
constitution 45 giving patients "a right to have access to any records
made or received in the course of business .. relating to any adverse
medical incident,"46 including incidents "reported to or reviewed by
any ...peer review, risk management, quality assurance, credentials,
or similar committee." 47 On enacting an implementing statute, the
state legislature specifically found that the amendment was not
intended "to repeal or otherwise modify existing laws governing the

38. Id. at 813 n.14.
39. Incident reports are created for unusual occurrences such as medication mis-dosing or
slips and falls.
40. See Fine, supra note 3, at 824 (citing Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304 (Mass. 1998)
(explaining that an incident report utilized by a peer review committee is privileged).
41. See, e.g., Sisters of Charity Health Sys. v. Raikes, 984 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Ky. 1998)
(finding peer review discoverable in a medical malpractice case); Burrows v. Redbud Cmty. Hosp.
Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 611-13 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (allowing peer review discovery for federal
EMTALA claim); Kalb v. Morehead, 654 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
hospital did not have immunity that would shield it from a negligent credentialing action).
42. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 3, at 738 (citing St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952
S.W.2d 503 (1997)) (finding that peer review statutes bar plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim
absent a showing of bad faith in credentialing).
43. See, e.g., David E. Willett, Protecting PeerReview Records in the Wake of Dal Cielo, CAL.
FAM. PHYSICIAN, May/Jun 1997, at 13, 18 (citing Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 923 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996))
(explaining that the peer review privilege in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 is not applicable to
subpoenas by investigative state agencies and that investigations are not "discovery").
44. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 3, at 814 ("[I]f the cost of limiting the rights of malpractice
plaintiffs and aggrieved physicians outweighs the benefit conferred on the public in reducing
medical error, peer review should be either overhauled or eliminated entirely.").
45. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25 (2006).
46. Id. § 25(a).
47. Id. § 25(c)(3).
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use of these records," and that immunity and privilege statutes for
quality-of-care-committees remain in "full force and effect. 48 The
statute allows patients to obtain incident records pertaining to other
de-identified patients' adverse medical incidents so long as they
pertain to the "same or substantially similar condition, treatment, or
49
diagnosis as that of the patient requesting access."
Florida courts have since considered the issues of whether
Amendment 7 is self-executing (i.e., that the voters mandated direct
access to quality records), if it may be applied retroactively, and the
There are four
constitutionality of the implementing statute.
appellate decisions. 50 Declaring Amendment 7 to be self-executing,
Buster found no retroactive application. 51 Bowen determined the
amendment to be self-executing, retroactive, 52 and the statute
unconstitutional. Michota denied certiorari to let stand a lower court
decision consistent with Buster. The appellant in Neavins asserted
trial court error in finding the amendment to be self-executing,
arguing that legislative implementation is required to address the
53
significant policy and practical issues raised by the amendment.
Certiorari was denied on grounds that passage of the implementing
statute mooted the appeal. The Florida Supreme Court has agreed to
hear Bowen and Buster.
Other commentators emphasize their concern that shielding
statutes have a harsh effect on disciplined physicians. 54 They argue
that courts interpret them to the detriment of plaintiff physicians
challenging disciplinary action imposed as a result of peer review by

48. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(2) (2006).
49. Id. § 381.028(7).
50. Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, No. 5D05-2195, 2006 WL 566084, at *7 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2006) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing); Notami Hosp. of Fla.,
Inc. v. Bowen, No. 1D05-4149, 2006 WL 1041542, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2006)
(holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing and that the statute purporting to implement
Amendment 7 is unconstitutional); Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Michota, 922 So. 2d 199 (Table)
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Bayfront Med. Ctr. v. Neavins, 920 So. 2d 185, 186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari as mooted by passage of the "Patients' Rightto-Know About Adverse Medical Incidents Act").
51. See Buster, 2006 WL 566084, at *7 ("Amendment 7 should be applied prospectively.").
52. See Bowen, 2006 WL 1041542, at *4 ("Because the plain language of the amendment
expresses a clear intent that it be applied to include records created prior to its effective date,
doing so is not an unconstitutional retroactive application.").
53. Neavins, 920 So. 2d at 186 (appellant claimed that the amendment failed "to meet the
test set forth in Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960)," for construing an amendment as
self-executing).
54. See Fine, supra note 3, for a view of challenges faced by physicians fighting disciplinary
actions; see also Gail G. Weiss, Is Peer Review Worth Saving?, MED. ECON., Feb. 18, 2005, at 46,
46-48 (explaining that physicians have a hard time defending themselves against peer reviewer
allegations).
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not allowing discovery of the very materials upon which the suit is
based. 55 They also claim that participants abuse the peer review
process for economic reasons.5 6 In addition, some writers worry that,
short of filing a lawsuit, disciplined physicians may be unable to
challenge the fairness of peer review 5 7 unless external independent
review is made available. 58 The low likelihood of success and high cost
of fighting disciplinary actions 59 leave some physicians without real

55. See Newton, supra note 3, at 741 & n.156 (citing Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927
S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996)) (explaining that statutes "would be emasculated" if a "simple allegation of
malice" was all that was needed to open up peer review to discovery). But see Yann H. van
Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Statures Have Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer
Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 250-51 (2001)
(noting that seventeen states permit access to peer review materials when a physician challenges
disciplinary action); Nijm, supra note 13, at 548 & n.46 (discussing how Maryland suspends
privilege in suits by subjects of peer review); AMA, H-265.998 GUIDELINES FOR DUE PROCESS,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf new/pf-online?f-n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/
H-265.998.HTM (stating that voluntary adherence to guidelines should meet each jurisdiction's
requirements, including giving the physician an "opportunity to be present at the hearing and
hear all of the evidence against him" as well as "to present a defense").
56. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1988) ("[P]etitioner contended that the
Clinic partners had initiated and participated in the hospital peer-review proceedings to reduce
competition from petitioner rather than to improve patient care."); see also van Geertruyden,
supra note 55, at 240 (describing how peer review presents the opportunity to be used for corrupt
economic or political motives).
57. See van Geertruyden, supra note 55, at 250, 253, 256-57 ("Faced with the legal burden
of proving bad faith, combined with the confidentiality and immunity protections provided at
both the state and federal level, the chances of an unemployed, or negatively affected physician
pursuing a court battle are slim."); see also Diane Gupton, Health Law-The Tenth Circuit
Lowers the Evidentiary Burden to Overcome Peer Review Immunity Under the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act-Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, 28 N. M. L. REV. 625, 625
(1998) ("The Brown court found that physician plaintiffs need show only that a difference of
opinion exists among medical experts on whether the scope of the review was reasonable to
create an issue of fact for the jury." (citing Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare, 101 F.3d 1324,
1334 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1461 (1997))).
58. See, e.g., van Geertruyen, supra note 55, at 251, 267-68 (finding that there is a "lack of
any meaningful appellate procedure available," and stating the need for "a quick and fair
review"; author favors state control of peer review or expeditious access to state courts to appeal
decisions); see also AMA D-375.996 PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY, available at http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pfnew/pf online?f.n=browse&doc=policyfiles/DIR/D-375.996.HTM
(recommending that medical staff bylaws establish an external review when a physician alleges
that a peer review is not objective and impartial).
59. See Merkel, supra note 28, at 311-12 (explaining that appellate courts are loathe to
second guess hospital and medical professionals' opinions regarding discipline or granting of
privileges (citing Gill v. Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Cipriotti v. Bd. of
Dirs. Of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Austin v.
McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934 (Dist. Cal. 1990), affd, 979 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1992))); see also
Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695,
704-07 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the "abandonment of patient" decision was
supported by the evidence; plaintiff was not denied a fair administrative hearing). But see
Gupton, supra note 57, at 625 (noting that after Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services,
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recourse in the face of events with the potential to devastate their
careers.60 When disciplinary actions are reported to the NPDB, 6' a
physician is left fighting on several fronts for his or her professional
life. 62
Critics also allege that peer review for a variety of reasons does
not adequately improve healthcare quality and safety. 63 One charge is
64
that many quality and safety issues are not referred for review.
Other studies suggest incomplete compliance with reporting
requirements, 65 including a suspicion that physicians facing imminent
discipline or dismissal resign, and that despite NPDB's provisions
their hospitals fail to report circumstances of departures. 66 Although
some writers propose greater penalties for hospitals and medical

physicians need only minimal evidence that the peer review was conducted unreasonably
because the burden shifts to defendants to show the review precluded difference in opinion).
60. See van Geertruyden, supra note 55, at 256-58 (arguing that NPDB may lead to
destruction of good physicians' careers rather than achieve monitoring of bad ones); see also
Edward H. Livingston & John D. Harwell, Peer review, 182 AM. J. SURGERY 103, 103-09 (2001)
(suggesting less punitive intermediate forms of reporting when appropriate).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1) (2006) (describing when and how to report certain
professional review actions); 45 C.F.R. § 60.5(c) (2006) (explaining when to report adverse actions
to the NPDB). NPDB's procedure to contest a report, 45 C.F.R. § 60.14, may not be helpful in
cases of disciplinary action. The prompt reporting requirement may lead to an erroneous report
which is difficult to expunge. Inquirers to NPDB may de-credential a physician from health plans
or deny privileges at another hospital, further impacting income and reputation. See, e.g., van
Geertruyden, supra note 55, at 257-58 ("Due to the reporting requirements of the NPDB, the
reviewed physician is essentially 'blacklisted."').
62. See van Geertruyden, supra note 55, at 256-57 (discussing how a reviewed physician
will have difficulty maintaining his professional reputation after a report is submitted to the
NPDB).
63. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 3, at 825 ("[S]tudies ... indicate that implementation of a
peer review program actually has little bearing on incidents of medical error at any given health
care institution."); Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 15-16 ('The peer review system ... should
address problems of physicians before they impact a physician's license to practice medicine.").
64. Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and
Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 369 (2005) (noting that safety and quality issues readily
recognized on work rounds are frequently not reported to official channels for follow-up and that
there are prior occurrence reports on file for only 13% of claims brought).
65. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 54.
66. HCQIA requires reporting in this circumstance under 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(2), but some
suspect such reports frequently are not filed, thereby defeating one of the databank's purposes.
See, e.g., Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National PractitionerData
Bank: ClinicalPrivileges Action Reports, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 349, 354 (1999) (concluding that
there is a low level of "clinical privileges action reportin"); see also van Geertruyden, supra note
55, at 254-55 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No.
OE-01-94-00050, HOSPITAL REPORTING TO THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK (1995))
(postulating that hospitals have an incentive to under-report because they are averse to the
possibility of negative publicity); Scheutznow, supra note 6, at 54 (discussing how the loss of
immunity under HCQIA as a penalty for failure to report has never been invoked so hospitals
have little incentive to report unless an applicable state statute has a strong penalty).
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groups who fail to report, 67 others consider underreporting to the
NPDB to be a symptom of its perceived inability in many situations to
achieve a proper balance between the interests of the public good and
the physicians. 68 Still other critics worry that peer review may be
under-used 9 and therefore may fail to identify, remediate, or remove
doctors who pose a danger to patients. They are even more troubled
by the notion that institutions that engage in little or no peer review
may use immunity and privilege protections to bar challenges to their
70
lack of due diligence.
B. A More Realistic Assessment
Academic critiques of peer review often speak in abstractions.
They focus not on medical and hospital committees' routine reviews
but on legal texts, most notably judicial decisions. 7 1 Legal texts are an
accessible information source, but they may not accurately reflect the
complex realities of modern medical centers.
Judicial cases in
deferring to the substantive judgments made by hospital and medical
professionals, 72 instead address alleged breakdowns in the peer review
process, inquiring, for example, whether an institution followed its
own procedures, or if bad motive was present. Courts do not examine
underlying structural issues which may be inherent in the essence of
peer review itself and which raise questions such as whether
traditional peer review can ever avoid some perception that a
disciplined physician was treated in an uneven manner relative to his
colleagues. As a result, the scope of judicial inquiry in adjudicated
cases directly influences which issues scholars explore and about

67. See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 57 (considering stronger state and federal
penalties for non-reporting).
68. See, e.g., Maguire, supra note 24 (explaining how hospitals circumvent reporting rules
by disciplining physicians for less than thirty days or by using mechanisms which do not require
reporting); Julie Barker Pape, Note, Physician Data Banks: The Public's Right to Know Versus
the Physician's Right to Privacy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 975, 1028 (1997) (noting that when
physicians cannot control dissemination of information to databanks they act to protect their
privacy interests, e.g., resist settling malpractice cases due to mandatory malpractice payment
reports).
69. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 47 (extrapolating from the premise that the number of
reports of adverse actions would correlate with the amount of peer review activity going on in the
institution and concluding that peer review protection statutes are not working sufficiently by
themselves to promote peer review).
70. Id. at 11.
71. See, e.g., Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W. 2d 14, 153 (N.D. 1996) (noting that
state peer review statutes differ and courts interpret them differently).
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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which they make policy recommendations, perhaps without all the
relevant information.
Similarly, critiques which focus on shielding statutes involving
discovery of peer review documents for judicial or extra-judicial
purposes or peer review participant liability, which are relevant only
in a litigation setting, place undue emphasis on the relatively small
number of cases that may merit litigation. 73 Peer review situations
that exhibit more subtle problems of inadvertent or subconscious
behaviors rather than bad faith, however, are unlikely to be litigated,
and so shielding statutes are not relevant to them.
The authors of this Article have extensive clinical, research,
consultative, and administrative experience in the areas of peer
review, risk management, and professional liability. On the basis of
this experience, we suggest that analysis of peer review in legal
literature does not always convey a realistic sense of the peer review
process. By focusing on outlier results, the legal literature does not
recognize the seriousness and commitment with which most
participants approach this responsibility or the profession's strong
ethical charge regarding peer review. 74 In light of these realities, we
will address the criticisms of peer review.
The defect in the peer review process may not be reviewers' bad
motives, but instead a failure to recognize that problematic outcomes
perceived to be attributable to over- or under-scrutiny may be due to
something else.
Given the seriousness of such unsatisfactory
outcomes, the process should be analyzed to determine possible causes
for questions about the trustworthiness of its outcomes. Perhaps
critics should focus on designing a system of peer review that supports
fairness, rather than simply continue to admonish participants to be
fair. If the process is easily subverted by bias or arbitrariness, more
systematic methods to assess physicians' performance would seem to
75
be desirable.
With respect to patients' interests, we agree that peer review
often fails to identify a problem physician. Studies of the peer review
process suggest an inability to reliably identify substandard care when
it is present because, except in an obvious case, physicians reviewing a

73. See Fine, supra note 3, at 828 (asserting that peer review pits physicians against one
another).
74. See, e.g., supra note 28; infra note 77.
75. See Eric J. Thomas & Laura A. Petersen, Measuring Errors and Adverse Events in
Health Care, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED 61, 63-65 (2003) (explaining that common methods used
to measure errors and adverse events are subject to bias, questions of inter-rater reliability, and
the Hawthorne effect).
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case often differ in their conclusions.76 Even in the face of bad clinical
outcomes, it can be difficult to discern whether one or even several
incidents represent an emerging pattern or just random events.
Multiple malpractice claims against a particular doctor suggest real
problems with a physician's practice, but traditional peer review may
not reveal why. It would appear then that traditional peer review
does not always identify those physicians at increased risk for claims,
nor does it offer doctors any information or insight to help them
address it.
We also are in agreement with commentators that human
77
factors may undermine the self-policing goal of peer review.
Reviewers may suggest that they would have made medical decisions
differently, yet decline to find fault if the reviewed doctor's approach
to the patient's medical issues is at least understandable, even if not
ideal. They may hesitate to judge close colleagues who do good work
in most circumstances, particularly if serious consequences, such as
sanctions and loss of income and reputation, could result.
Notwithstanding the practical obstacles disciplined physicians face
when fighting sanctions, peer reviewers may also fear the potential for
legal challenges. Thus, committees have incentives to refer none but
the most obviously mismanaged cases to an executive governing
78
board.
76.

See, e.g., R.A.

Caplan

et al.,

Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments of

Appropriatenessof Care, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1957, 1957 (1991) (concluding that "knowledge of

the severity of outcome can influence a reviewer's judgment of the appropriateness of care");
Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors:
Preventability is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 415, 419 (2001) ("Reviewers
may be reluctant to second-guess the care of fellow clinicians, and many errors may not be
documented in the medical record or identifiable by chart review."); Rhoda D. Levine et al., The
Effect of Group Discussion on Interrater Reliability of Structured Peer Review, 89
ANESTHESIOLOGY 507, 514-15 (1998) (recommending that peer review not be used in certain
circumstances because of the high variability in the opinions of reviewers); A. Russell Localio et
al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a
Retrospective Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 460-63 (1996) ("[A]ssessments
based on medical records, especially when implicit and not guided by objective criteria, produce
disagreement among physicians on the appropriateness and quality of care ... "); Karen L.
Posner et al., Variation in Expert Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY
1049, 1049-54 (1996) (noting the frequency of diverging opinions on the appropriateness of care
among anesthesiologists); Eric J. Thomas et al., The Reliability of Medical Record Review for
Estimating Adverse Event Rates, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 812, 814 (2002) (finding "poor
inter-rater reliability among physicians trying to identify adverse events and negligent events
by medical record review").
77. But see AMA, Ethical Op. E-4.07, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/
uploadlmm/465[bot17i04.rtf ("[Plersonal friendships, antagonisms, jurisdictional disputes, or fear
of competition

should

not play a role

in

...

decisions.

Physicians

...

have

an ethical

responsibility to be guided [by the patients' best interests].").
78. ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH BEHIND
AMERICA'S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES 322-25 (2004).
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Support for peer review may also have been eroded by the
Institute of Medicine's reports "To Err is Human" and "Crossing the
Quality Chasm." 79 These reports, which estimate that medical error
causes 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year,8 0 suggest that a focus on
addressing faulty systems rather than individual accountability would
decrease error rates.
These reports could promote skepticism
regarding peer review's effectiveness, unless we recognize that
personal accountability must still be addressed.
Critics who cite the health care industry's safety record may
convincingly argue for changes in the law to combat under-use of peer
review or under-reporting to the NPDB, and to assure public access to
the results of peer review. However, such measures may backfire and
have a chilling effect on physicians' willingness to participate or to be
fully candid. Critics rarely suggest alternative ways to help the peer
review process achieve better outcomes, which in turn would fulfill the
public's quality and safety needs.
C. The Underlying Problem
The underlying problem with peer review is not inadvertent
leniency (which is unfair to patients), or subtle bias (which is unfair to
physicians under investigation). Rather, it is that the peer review
process is often not directly linked to an institution's ongoing risk
management activities. The failure to link these logically related
functions has isolated most medical institutions' peer review process,
ignoring peer review's potential as a mechanism for ex ante risk
reduction and relegating it to an ex post adjudicatory role. It is in the
former role that peer review might credibly address future malpractice
claims risk.
Consider the earlier case of a physician who was sued five
times but retrospective medical records review revealed no clearly
substandard care. Presumably the institution did not identify, nor
was the physician aware, that he was at high risk of malpractice

79. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); COMM. ON QUALITY OF
HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001).

80. Estimates of the number of deaths from medical error are controversial. See Lucian L.
Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical ErrorFigures are Not Exaggerated, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
95, 95-97 (2000) (discussing factors that suggest medical error figures are not exaggerated);
Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in Institute of
Medicine Report, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 93, 94 (2000) ("Clearly, more study with careful
attention to risk levels is needed to determine the true impact of adverse events on death rates
among hospitalized patients.").
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claims. Even in the face of a new lawsuit against the physician, the
peer review committee is now poorly positioned to advise a physician
of his or her risk or tell the physician what to do to avoid future
claims. In fact, if they communicate their impressions based on
quality review of his patients' medical records, these may or may not
be correct. The committee cannot determine if the doctor is simply
unlucky or if there are other factors at work which they can neither
identify nor articulate. Adjudicatory, ex post peer review cannot
respond to issues of future loss reduction. Therefore, traditional peer
review does not help risk managers, medical group administrators,
healthcare institutions, and physicians address these important
issues.
Given the structure of peer review, these gaps are hardly
surprising. Generally, limited numbers of charts and cases are
reviewed. Peer reviewers rarely compare similar cases attended by
different physicians. Trending is generally not done, and patterns
may not be easily discerned. Even when a theme seems to exist, it is
often based on anecdotes from a small number of cases rather than a
systematic review of the physician that quantifies his risk of
malpractice claims relative to that of his colleagues'. Reviewers focus
on the question as to whether or not the physician met the standard of
care, and may ignore or deem irrelevant other forms of care judged not
to have directly contributed to or had much impact on the ultimate
8
outcome. '
Another weakness of traditional peer review is that reviewers
are unable to evaluate aspects of care not documented in the medical
record.8 2 While the written record may show that the physician
effectively evaluated and treated a patient's medical issue, the
patient's assessment that she experienced an exceptionally long
response time to her telephone inquiry or that her doctor didn't listen
well or communicate adequately is rarely discernible from the chart.
While the healthcare environment and the ability of systems to
prevent lapses are important, the physician-patient relationship is
still at the heart of medical care. Many fundamental drivers of safety
and quality are largely under a physician's control: the thoughtfulness
with which patients' needs are addressed, communication with
patients and families to acquire critical information and achieve
consensual care plans, and accessibility to care. The patient-physician
81.

But see Andrew A. White et al., Cause-and-Effect Analysis of Risk Management Files to

Assess Patient Care in the Emergency Department, 11 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MED. 1035, 1038-

40 (2004) (noting that shared causes, some potentially correctable, account for real or perceived
adverse outcomes).
82.

Andrews, supra note 64, at 362.
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interaction plays a pivotal role in healthcare outcomes. When that
interaction goes awry, health care goes awry. Patients may become
mistrustful or angry. They may fail to act on medical advice (nonadherence) or delay action, or become convinced that their poor
outcome was caused by an aspect of their medical care. Peer review
seldom provides insight into a physician's accessibility, how well he
communicates, or whether he displays empathy. In particular, peer
review does not link these "soft" aspects of care to risk of being the
subject of medical malpractice claims.
Assume now that in our case scenario the peer review
committee found obvious substandard medical care in most of the
physician's malpractice cases. The reviewers would be confident that
the doctor poses a risk to patients and refer the case to the hospital's
governing board for further action. Loyalty to their colleague would
be overcome, and not even fear of litigation would stop them from
taking steps to limit privileges or remove the doctor from the staff.
Would peer review have achieved the right goal? The answer is
likely yes, if, repeatedly, some aspect of technical skills or
decisionmaking is the clearly and unambiguously identified deficiency.
However, in most cases the committee will not find documented
technical weaknesses, and yet, the institution must still deal with the
physician's recurring malpractice claims problem. Perhaps our goal
should be to identify physicians at high risk of malpractice suits before
such claims materialize and take action to reduce that risk.
Many observers are rethinking how to approach the goal of
Traditional peer review could consider
improving health care.
incorporating features of recent successful initiatives within the
healthcare industry.8 3 The usefulness of aggregate data has been
demonstrated by the first comprehensive state reporting program,
Pennsylvania's Medical Care Availability and Error Reduction Act of
2002 ("MCare").8 4 Analyses of aggregated reports of serious events or
incidents ("near-misses")8 5 filed by hospitals have led to the
development of educational tools and guidelines that assist in the
86
delivery of safer care.

83. See, e.g., Josh Goldstein, Medication Errors Cut in Area, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Jan. 6, 2005, at C1 (discussing how a regional effort launched in Feb. 2001 by the Delaware
Valley Healthcare Council at 49 hospitals resulted in a 22% improvement toward meeting the
Council's goal).
84.

40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.101 (2006).

85. Id. § 1303.302. An "incident" is defined as "an event.., which could have injured the
patient but did not.... The term does not include a serious event." Id.
86. Thirty percent of hospitals responding to the PA PSA survey implemented patient
safety protocols as a result of Patient Safety Advisory Reports. PATIENT SAFETY AUTH., ANNUAL

2006]

RETHINKING PEER REVIEW

1193

Peer reviewers might similarly find tools which provide
analyzed aggregate data helpful. As patients become more involved in
their own care,8 7 asking questions, maintaining alertness, and
bringing observations of potential compromises in safety and quality
to the attention of healthcare professionals or administrators at
medical facilities, many also file complaints with offices of patient
relations ("ombudsmen") established for this purpose. Complaints
may offer a rich source of such information to discover patterns of
dissatisfaction that provide insight into physicians' malpractice claims
risk.88 We will discuss this possibility further in Part III of this
Article.
We need to also consider other paradigms within the
healthcare industry to support new models for peer review. The shift
towards a "continuous improvement" model8 9 encourages efforts to
improve processes rather than focus on weeding out "bad apples."
While not denying the need to regulate dangerous outliers, 90 the model
assumes that most healthcare workers have good intentions, work
hard, and do not make willful errors. 91 In an environment which
removes fear of blame, healthcare workers given data about processes
are empowered to make changes by designing and implementing
strategies to improve patient safety and reduce medical error. 92 We
REPORT FOR 2004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005), available at http://www.psa.state.pa.us/psa/
cwp/view.asp?a=1275&q=445714.
87. See, e.g., ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, WALL OF SILENCE 239-45
(2003) (discussing how patients can protect themselves); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CONSUMER PROT. & QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUS., FINAL REPORT APPENDIX A:
CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1997), available at http://www.hcquality

commission.gov/final/appenda.html (arguing that "[glreater individual involvement by
consumers in their care increases the likelihood of achieving the best outcomes and helps support
a quality improvement, cost-conscious environment").
88. Kecia N. Carroll et al., Characteristicsof Families that Complain Following Pediatric
Emergency Visits, 5 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 326, 326 (2005) (finding that black patients are
underrepresented in complaint files compared to white patients, relative to percent of emergency
department visits, after controlling for factors such as payer status).
89. See van Geertruyden, supra note 55, at 269 ("An alternative approach to the peer review
process that has been advocated by many in the medical profession views quality of care not from
an adversarial, aggressive standpoint, but rather from a theory of continuous improvement."
(citing Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 53, 53 (1989))); see also COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 2005, supra note 27, at ACC-12 (noting that on-site survey has shifted to
model assessing "continuous operational improvement in support of safe, high-quality care,
treatment, and services").
90. Berwick, supra note 89, at 54.
91. Id. at 55.
92. See id. at 54 (arguing that the best way to improve health-care quality is to adopt the
Theory of Continuous Improvement which focuses all personnel in a production process on
improvement); see also Anne C. O'Neil et al., PhysicianReporting Compared with Medical Record
Review to Identify Adverse Medical Events, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 370, 370 (1993) (finding
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believe that physicians also need useful information to facilitate their
self-improvement, which current modes of peer review do not always
provide. We propose a complementary model to encourage peer-driven
self-improvement and correction.
Finally, methods of peer review should also be able to
demonstrate that they are effective. Effectiveness is an outcome of
utilizing evidence-based practices developed through systematic data
acquisition and analysis which are shown to achieve better long-term
results in the quality of care than alternatives. 93 The impetus to
improve patient safety with information acquired in a blame-free,
cooperative, solution-seeking milieu will be reassuring only if it is
effective. Peer review may yet have a robust part to play in putting to
rest the underlying concerns of some scholars, courts, and the public.

III. UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING MALPRACTICE CLAIMS RISK
THROUGH PEER REVIEW
A. Correlatesof Medical MalpracticeRisk
Medical malpractice research studies conducted over the past
two decades asked such questions as why patients sue their doctors,
which doctors get sued, and whether some doctors attract more suits
than others. The results of these studies suggest some reasons why
traditional peer review may not be able to identify and address
important components of risk. This Section argues that an expanded
model of peer review, however, can identify at least some of these
components.
Consider some research findings.
Medical record reviews
suggest that adverse events (injuries due to medical care rather than
underlying disease) occur in up to 6 percent of hospital stays. 94 About
one-third of those adverse events has a component attributable to

that housestaff-identified adverse events are more likely to be preventable than adverse events
identified by chart review).
93. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Accidental Deaths, Saved Lives, and Improved Quality, 353
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1405, 1408 (2005).

94. See, e.g., Stephen Zuckerman, Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical
Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 94 & n. 40 (1986) (discussing
the CAL. MED. ASS'N AND CAL. HOSP. ASS'N, MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (D. Mills

ed., 1977), which found that "injuries, negligent or otherwise... [resulted from] 4.65% of all
hospital inpatient stays..."); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical PracticeStudy I, 324 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 370, 371 (1991) ("We estimated the... incidence rate of adverse events to have
been 3.7 per cent .... ); id. at 375, Thl. 3 (showing that over age 65, the rate of adverse events
was 5.7% (+/-0.6%)).
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negligence, 95 and therefore, represents a medically valid potential
lawsuit. Interestingly, in only 2 percent of these cases is a lawsuit
filed, but five to seven times more patients sue in cases where medical
96
record review suggests no negligence.
A number of studies have asked why patients sue. 97 In one
study conducted by Vanderbilt University researchers ("Vanderbilt
group"), former obstetrical patients in Florida who filed suit for
alleged injuries to their infants were asked what prompted them to
seek legal representation.9 8 While money damages was a motivation
for 24 percent of the parents, their most frequent reason was that
someone they trusted (commonly another physician) suggested they
had been victims of poor care. Other factors that prompted them to
file were the need for information about what happened, their sense
that there was a cover-up, the child's limited future, or "revenge." 99
95. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 94, at 371 ("The percentage of adverse events due to
negligence was 27.6 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 22.5 to 32.6)."); Eric J. Thomas et
al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED.
CARE 261, 261 (2000) ("In Utah, 32.6 +/- 4% of adverse events were due to negligence; in
Colorado, 27.4 +/- 2.4%."). But see Andrews, supra note 64, at 361-62 (finding that medical error
occurred in 45.8% of patients in surgical units in one teaching hospital and "seriously impacted"
17.7% of these patients, "ranging from temporary disability to death").
96. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events
Due To Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I1, 325 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
245, 248, Tbl. 3 (1991) (showing 1/6-1/7 of total claimants suffered adverse events caused by
negligence).
[The ratio of adverse events caused by negligence to medical malpractice claims of] 7.6
to 1 does not mean ... that 13 to 14 percent of injuries due to negligence lead to
claims.... [T]he fraction of medical negligence that leads to claims is probably under
2 percent. The difference is accounted for by injuries not caused by negligence ... that
give rise to claims.
Id. at 249; see David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in
Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253-54, Tbl. 1 (2000) ("The adverse event was attributed
to negligence in 4 claims. Thus, 14 of the 18 claims (78%; 95% CI, 56 to 92) were made in the
absence of negligence . . ."); Id. at 254-55 ("The probability of a claim after a negligent adverse
event is 2.5% (95% CI, 0.1 to 4.9)."). But see Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical
Practice Study Conclusions about the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 501, 502 (2005) ("[T]he finding that most medical malpractice claims are not based on
either iatrogenic injury or provider negligence stands on a small and precarious empirical base.
Indeed, the ... data are as likely to support a ... finding.., that most malpractice claims are
reasonably related to medical management injuries and provider negligence.").
97. See, e.g., Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients
Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'v REV. 105, 118 (1990) (discussing the results of a
study examining the dispute resolution method of choice between patients and doctors); Charles
Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors?, 343 THE LANCET 1609, 1609-13 (1994) (examining
why patients and their relatives bring malpractice suits). '
98. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following PerinatalInjuries, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1359, 1359 (1992).
99. Id. at 1361 (discussing study results indicating that the most common reasons (average
2
1.4 per claimant) for filing claims are: advice by others (33%), need for money ( 4%), revenge or
deterrence (19%), perception of a cover-up (24%), desire for more information (20%), and
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Are all physicians at equal risk for suits? Sloan, et al., in
examining the claims experience of Florida physicians, found that for
each discipline, 75-85 percent of awards and settlement costs over a
five-year period were made on behalf of only 3-8 percent of that group
of physicians. 10 0
According to another study, it appeared that
physicians' risk of malpractice claims was stable and persistent; in
other words, high risk today means high risk in the future. 10 1
Why might some physicians attract a disproportionate number
of claims?
Several factors may be at work.
Demographic
characteristics of patients who sue vary from study to study. 10 2
Looking for other factors potentially associated with claims, Entman
et al., conducted a study in which they evaluated whether there was a
difference in technical competency between high-suit and low-suit
physicians. 10 3 They sorted obstetricians into four groups based on
their malpractice experience over a six-year period.10 4 Blind reviews
of their medical records by obstetric, neonatal intensivist, and
pediatric specialists revealed no significant group differences in the
obstetricians' technical competence. The researchers also found no
difference in patient risk factors among the physician groups. 105 In a
realization that child will have no future (20%); May & Stengel, supra note 97, at 118-19 ("Suers
extensively seek input from friends and relatives, lawyer friends, and unnamed confidants in
making their dispute resolution choices. They question their doctor's competence and concern
about the personal effects of their medical problem, and believe that they have experienced a
serious injury.").
100. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians:Predictablefor
Haphazard?, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3291, 3293 (1989) ("More than 85% of the payments for
physicians in the medical specialty group were made on behalf of only 3% of physicians.... In
the obstetrics-anesthesiology group, more than 85% of payments were incurred by approximately
6% of physicians. For the surgical specialty group, three fourths of the total payment was made
on behalf of 7.8% of physicians.").
101. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Kenneth R. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physician's
Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict the Future?,272 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 1421, 1424 (1994) (finding that physicians with claims (whether paid or unpaid) during a
baseline six-year period were two to four times more likely to have new claims over the
subsequent three years than those with no claims during the baseline period).
102. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 64, at 371 (stating that white and wealthier patients
more likely to bring claims); Sloan, supra note 99, at 29 (finding that patients who sued reflected
the demographic and financial spread of Floridians and the US population in general); Frank A.
Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice
Claim, 29 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 413, 427-28 (1996) (finding that for birth injuries, Catholics were
more likely to claim; blacks less likely to claim than whites; income had no effect on likelihood of
claiming); Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More?, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1697, 1701
(1993) (finding that in the face of medical injury, the poor, elderly and uninsured are less likely
to sue than other patients).
103. Stephen S. Entman et al., The Relationship Between Malpractice Claims History and
Subsequent Obstetric Care, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1588, 1588 (1994).
104. Id. at 1590.
105. Id. at 1589.
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second study, women randomly selected from Florida vital statistics
were sorted into four groups based on their obstetrician's malpractice
10 7
experience. 10 6 None had filed lawsuits against their obstetricians.
Patients answered open-ended questions about their obstetric care.1 08
The researchers found significant differences among the four groups'
responses regarding their physicians' communications, care and
treatment, access and availability, and concern for them as valued
persons. 10 9 At least twice as many patients complained about the
high-suit physicians compared with low-suit physicians. 11 0
The
authors concluded that the same small percentage of physicians
responsible for high numbers of malpractice cases were also associated
with higher numbers of patient complaints, even among patients who
never sued. 1
B. Physicians'MalpracticeClaim Risk According to Their Patient
Complaint Files
Since the research suggested an association between patient
dissatisfaction and malpractice claims risk, the Vanderbilt group
sought to examine whether a common and readily available source of
patient complaints-unsolicited concerns recorded by a patient
relations department-would be similarly associated with malpractice
risk. Using patient relations and risk management data covering a
six-year period at a large academic medical center, the first analysis
revealed that 9 percent of the medical group physicians were
112
associated with 50 percent of all physician-related complaints.
Logistic regression analyses showed that the two strongest variables
for risk were the physician's area of practice (for example, Surgery
was at higher risk than Medicine 1 3) and the volume of unsolicited
patient complaints.1 1 4
All physician-related types of patient

106. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Obstetricians' Prior Malpractice Experience and Patients'
Satisfaction with Care, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1583, 1583 (1994).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1586.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 2951, 2953 (2002).

113. For the purpose of this Article, "Surgery" includes all general and subspecialist fields of
surgery, including otolaryngogology, obstetrics-gynecology, neurosurgery, and orthopedics, and
"Medicine" includes primary care fields, including pediatrics, internal medicine, family medicine,
as well as medicine and pediatric subspecialties.
114. Hickson, supra note 112, at 2955.
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complaints (i.e., communication, care and treatment, concern for
patients, access and availability, environment) appeared to indicate
115
dissatisfaction and were associated with a higher risk of claims.
The logistic regression equations were next used to further
describe the risk management experiences of the medical group
members (Table 1).116 A "risk score" was calculated for each physician
by inserting values for his or her type of practice (Medicine or
Surgery), service volume, and number of unsolicited patient
complaints into the regression equation.
Every medical group
member was sorted into one of five empirically determined risk
categories. Next, the mean risk management payouts (dollars and
percentage of dollars paid out) for each of the five groups was
calculated, and each group's mean number of complaints per physician
was assessed.
Table 1
Risk Management Expenses and Patient Complaints for 5 Groupings
of a Medical Center's Physicians Based upon Calculated Risk Scores.
Predicted

Risk
Category

Total

# (%)

MDs

Mean
Paid Dollars
Out*

Percentage

Mean

of Total
Dollars
Paid

Number of
Complaints

Out

per MD

1 (low)

318(49)

1

4%

2

2

147 (23)

6

13%

6

3

76(12)

4

4%

10

4

52 (8)

42

29%

16

5 (high)

51 (8)

73

50%

42

644 (100)

100%

* Dollar value of low risk group adjusted to one. All otherphysician groups

represented in multiples of low risk group.

Nearly half (49%) of the medical group (Category 1) had risk
scores that clustered at the low end of the distribution.
Each

115. Id.
116. Previously unpublished data.
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physician in the group averaged two unsolicited complaints in the sixyear study period.
By contrast, 8 percent of physicians whose
calculated risk scores clustered at the high end (Category 5) of the
distribution averaged forty-two complaints each. The low risk group
was responsible for 4 percent of all risk management-related costs,
whereas the highest risk group was responsible for 50 percent of
dollars paid out (including court costs, attorneys' fees, and payments
to claimants). Even more startling is that physicians in the high risk
group had an average payout seventy-three times that of their low
117
risk colleagues.
C. An Opportunity to Reduce Malpractice Claims Risk
Given the association between complaints and malpractice
claim risk, the Vanderbilt group developed the Patient Advocacy
Reporting System ("PARSs r ) to investigate how complaint data might
be used to reduce risk and promote quality care. Research using this
program has been ongoing for the past six years at multiple sites. In
brief, patient complaints are coded, 118 analyzed, and a complaint index
is generated for each physician and compared with other medical
group members. A higher index reflects higher risk for medical
malpractice claims. Physicians with an index greater than the ninetyfifth percentile are candidates for peer-to-peer intervention.
We have developed and implemented a training program at all
facilities that have adopted the PARSSM process. Each institution
establishes a committee in compliance with its state's requirements
for protected peer review. Committee members are nominated to be
trained as "messenger peers" on the basis of several criteria: they are
distributed among practice types, in current active practice, respected
by colleagues, committed to confidentiality, and willing to serve. Their
own complaint scores are mostly satisfactory, but on occasion, some
high risk physicians have served as messengers.
Peer physicians
receive six to eight hours of training to help them deliver the data and
the essential message to high-complaint colleagues.
Various
intervention support materials are explained and peers role play to
practice delivering the data and responding to common reactions.
117. While the risk management payouts generally increased with increasing risk score
groupings, an exception occurred in the second risk category: one physician with very few
unsolicited patient complaints was associated with a single large jury verdict, so the prediction,
while evidently quite good, results in small numbers of both false positives and false negatives.
118. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Development of an Early Identification and Response
Model of Malpractice Prevention, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13-14 (1997) (discussing in
detail how the system used a coding method to turn raw patient reports, such as 'doctor was
rude,' into a data set that is easily analyzed using statistical tools).
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Most institutions adopt three levels of interventions. Level 1
involves a confidentially delivered, non-punitive peer awareness
intervention.
Level 2 involves an authority figure, usually a
department chair or chief of service, and development of a specific
action plan. Level 3 involves higher levels of administration and the
institution's disciplinary process.
A typical Level 1 intervention proceeds as follows:11 9 The
committee chair gives each high-complaint physician's intervention
support materials to one messenger, who sees only the materials for
the physician(s) whom he will visit. Folders contain: (1) a signed
letter from the messenger which describes the program and reveals
the doctor's rank in both the overall medical group and broad areas of
either "Medicine" or "Surgery"; (2) a table showing the physician's
complaint type distribution (Table 2); (3) text of complaint narratives;
(4) a "Report Card" illustrating the specific individual's ranking in the
physician group (Figure 1), and; (5) wherever applicable, a copy of the
institution's policy regarding this program. The positive intent of the
process is emphasized, and the letter concludes with a request to meet
and discuss the data. When they meet, messengers are urged to give
no diagnoses or prescriptions. They are only to share the data,
encourage creative thinking, and promise to return when follow-up
data are available.

119. See James W. Pichert et al., Using Patient Complaints to Communicate Concerns to
Colleagues, in ACADEMIC COMPENSATION AND PRODUCTION REPORT (Med. Group Mgmt. Ass'n
ed., 2004) 16, 16-19 (describing a typical intervention program).
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Table 2
Complaint Type Summary
Medical Center Name
Period 1 - Period 2
Care Provider: Dr. John Doe

PERCENT OF TOTAL
NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS
Your
Average for
Your
Average for
Medicine
Complaints
Complaints Medicine
Complaint Type

Communication
Care and Treatment
Concern for Persons
Accessibility
Environment Problems
Billing Issues
Total

2.0
5.4
2.7
1.3
0.0
1.6
13

6
16
26
5
0
5
58

15.4%
41.5%
20.8%
10.0%
0.0%
12.3%
100%

10.3%
27.6%
44.9%
8.6%
0.0%
8.6%
100%

Figure 1
Facility Index Distribution Graph
Figure 1.

Facility Index Distribution Graph "You are Here"
Distribution of Complaint Indexes: mmlddlyy - mmdd/yy
Distribution is based upon unsolicited patient/family complaints recorded by the Patient Relations Representatives.
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The Index reflects the complaints with which each physician was associated. It is based on an algorithm that weighs complaints
recorded in the past year more heavily than those recorded in prior years.
Confidential Peer Review Document - Privileged Pursuant to [State] Statutes.

Figure 1 illustrates calculated indexes for all facility physicians
based on age of complaint (more recent complaints are given more
weight) and intensity of complaint (multiple sub-complaints contained
within a complaint report). Physicians are shown where their index
lies on the grid, which vividly demonstrates that colleagues practicing
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under the same conditions are associated with fewer complaints. For
follow-up visits, a line graph (Figure 2) shows change in the
physician's index over time relative to his or her area of practice and
facility.
Figure 2.
Physician's Index Over Time Relative to Facility and Area of Practice
[Facility Name]

160

Dr.

140
X
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100

Your index

80

60
E
0
40

Avg. Surgery Index

20
Avg. Group Index
I

0

Period I
Group Rank
Surgery Rank

3
3

Period 2
8
5

Period 3
26
20

Period 4
78
43

Physicians whose indexes do not improve are considered
candidates for Level 2 interventions. Level 2 interventions involve an
authority figure, such as a section chief or chair of a department, with
whom data is shared. They develop a plan, tailored to the extent and
severity of issues. The plan may be designed to help a doctor with
practice management, referral for health or psychiatric evaluation, or
continuing education-based skills training.
Follow-up is ongoing for all physicians. If a physician shows
positive trending, he or she will receive positive feedback. If and when
the index falls to the normal range, physicians are congratulated on
their success, and meetings with the peer are suspended. Surveillance
continues for the entire medical staff, and if a doctor's index increases,
If Level 2 results in no
he or she is intervened upon again.
level
involve
higher
Level
3
interventions
improvement,
administrators who may invoke the institution's disciplinary process.
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As of this writing, composite intervention results are available
for ten institutions. To date, 283 initial Level 1 and close to 400
follow-up interventions have occurred. Most have been well-received;
fewer than 2 percent met with overt hostility. Most intervenees
respond professionally. They may request to be shadowed to get
suggestions for improvement, seek resources from their chair which
they think will help improve their service, or reorganize their unit. At
seven sites, 202 physicians have been tracked long enough to have
follow-up data (Table 3).

Table 3
PARSsM Follow-Up Data After Level 1 Interventions
(202 Physicians at 7 Sites)
No. (%)
Complaint indexes improved

118 (59)

Complaint indexes unimproved or worse, but interventions remain at Level 1

42 (21)

Departed after Level 1 intervention(s)
"
Departed soon after Level 1
"
Index improved
"
Index unimproved or worse
Interventions moved to Level 2
>
Departed after Level 2, unimproved
>
Index improved
>
No further data yet available

35 (17)
19
8
8
7 (3)
3
1
3

Overall, about two-thirds of physicians receiving interventions
demonstrate improved indexes. Level 2 interventions occurred in
three institutions, involving seven physicians, three of whom have
since departed.
Thirty-eight physicians in total are no longer at their facilities.
Departures were related to job location changes or retirement (n=34),
and, in four cases, death. We can only speculate that perhaps these
physicians "solved" their issues by moving on, were experiencing
work-related dissatisfaction which somehow communicated itself to
patients, or an existing illness or impending retirement left them less
focused on patient care. Because very good doctors can be caught in
and decide to leave unsupportive environments, we also make no
judgments about their qualifications at the time of departure.
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Finally, preliminary data from a large academic medical center
(Figure 3)120 suggest that the initiation of interventions in two waves
during late 1998 and early 2000 is associated with reduction in
claims1 21 and lawsuits 122 based on volume of service. 123 Rates of
the institution's general liability (e.g., premises liability) and
professional liability claims, both adjusted per 10,000 Relative Value
Units ("RVUs") of care delivered each year, were analyzed to
understand the institution's trends in risk management activity over
time. The trends for general and professional liability claims differed
significantly (Year X Type of Liability interaction, t=3.5, p=0.006).
There was a significant downward slope in the institution's
professional liability data (t=-3.39, p=0.02), whereas the general
liability data showed no significant change over time. 124 In other
words, the salutary effects seemed specific to professional liability
actions, and the reduction did not appear to be an artifact. Several
factors besides the PARS sM intervention program may have
contributed to the trend, including changes in the risk management
process, medical procedures, staff, patient/payor expectations, case
mix, legal climate for malpractice claims, institutional marketing, and
internal quality and safety programs. Whether interventions account
for a small or large proportion of the positive effect cannot now be
determined, but these preliminary results are encouraging.

120. Previously unpublished data.
121. Claims are defined as pre-suit risk management files associated with at least one of the
following: demand for payment by patient or patient's legal representative, payment of legal fees
or consultant fees, or payment made to a potential plaintiff (patient or other party-in-interest).
122. Lawsuits are defined as filed suits regardless of ultimate disposition or outcome.
123. Patient volume is defined in Relative Value Units, or RVUs. WILLIAM C. HSAIO ET AL., A
NATIONAL STUDY OF RESOURCE-BASED RELATIVE VALUE SCALES FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES:
HARVARD UNV. PHASE III STUDY. FINAL REPORT, REVISED vol. 1:215 (1992).

124. Analyses employed the R statistical package, general linear model analysis. As Figure 3
shows, the overall rate of PL and GL claims differed significantly (F, = 12.3, p<.01), but this
difference is not interesting. It is the differential slopes of the lines that suggest that
interventions directed at reducing PL appear to have had a greater effect than any concurrent
interventions designed to reduce GL.
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Figure 3.
Number of Claims per 10,000 Relative Value Units (RVUs) over Time.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite legal protections established by federal and state
legislatures to encourage medical peer review, many observers assert
that its outcomes fall short of expectations. Critics of peer review
rarely attribute peer review's perceived inability to adequately protect
interests of patients and reviewed physicians to its ex post method of
review. We suggest an alternative view that peer review may be used
very effectively to address, ex ante, the disproportionate malpractice
claims risk of some physicians.
In this Article, we introduce and discuss the use of the
Vanderbilt PARSsM program as part of institutions' peer review
framework. The program aggregates patient complaint data into
comparative indexes to share with physicians at high risk for
malpractice claims. Follow-up data show that indexes improve for the
majority of physicians who learn about their status from a peer. Our
study of this methodology at five institutions provides empirical
evidence that suggests the program may identify physicians at
increased risk of malpractice claims and have an impact on improving
their patient complaint profile. At one site, we have demonstrated a
possible reduction in malpractice claims for the institution related to
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the implementation of the program. Further research on PARS s M
data is ongoing and may determine the magnitude of the effect.
There are several features of the PARSsM program which
promote success. We recognize that this program is just one of several
potential strategies for strengthening medical peer review, and feel
strongly that similar elements should apply to any effective peer
review program. First, whenever possible, peer review is likely to be
more effective when based on aggregate data, not single events, and
designed to apply to all physicians equally. Comparison with peers
strengthens the contextual quality of the data.
Second, data
presented in graphic form, and conveyed in person in a non-punitive,
non-judgmental, non-directive fashion, respects a colleague's
professionalism,
dignity, and
problem-solving
abilities,
and
encourages creative thinking.
Third, peers need to be carefully
selected based on commitment to confidentiality, willingness to
participate in the process, reputation among the medical staff, and
when feasible, matched by discipline. If disinclined to continue, peers
should be free to drop out of a peer review program. Fourth, peers
should be trained to share data comfortably, and prepared to deal with
predictable pushback from physicians. Finally, an escalating process
must be built in to assure that administrators become involved when
physicians do not respond to a peer-based program. We believe that if
these principles are consistently incorporated into peer review
programs to complement traditional peer review, a clearer picture of
physicians' risk for malpractice claims will emerge which can be
constructively addressed in most cases and result in better patient
care.
Finally, we believe that PARSsM and other peer review
programs need continued legal protections in order to operate most
effectively. Confidentiality of peer review data beyond those with an
administrative need-to-know is essential, and protection from legal
discovery-so long as they are genuinely used to promote quality and
safety-is paramount.
Interests of institutions, physicians, and
patients are harmed if there are disincentives to implement and
utilize methodologies which serve those interests.

